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The Value and Normative Role of
Knowledge
JULIEN DUTANT
Over a decade as my supervisor and mentor, Pascal has skilfully managed to
keep me under the impression that I carried my research freely while quietly
guiding my attention towards deeper and unfamiliar issues. He thus introdu-
ced me to knowledge-ﬁrst epistemology, the debate over pragmatic encroach-
ment and the role of norms, values and reasons in epistemology before I quite
grasped their signiﬁcance. Each time the new thoughts would slowly make
their way into my own and I would eventually ﬁnd myself intensely preoccu-
pied with the issues that were central to Pascal’s seminars a few years back.
The present paper is another instance of this phenomenon. I dedicate it to
Pascal, with all my respect and gratitude, and with apologies for my esprit
d’escalier.
In his (2009), Pascal connects two topics that epistemologists have mostly
kept apart. One is the debate over pragmatic encroachment, namely, the idea
that whether one knows (or believes, or justiﬁably believes) partly depends
on practical factors such as one’s interests and the stakes one faces. Central
to this debate is the claim that knowledge is the norm of action : that is, that in
some salient sense of “ought”, one ought to act in view of what one knows.
The other issue is the question of the value of knowledge, namely, whether and
why knowledge is a good thing, and in particular, a better thing than mere
true belief. Most of Pascal’s paper deals with pragmatic encroachment. It was
what attracted all my attention then. But it also raised a second question that
epistemologists seldom discuss : could the idea that knowledge is the norm
of action explain the value of knowledge ? Pascal’s answer was negative. At
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the time I could hardly get my mind around the question. It is not prima facie
clear how one could even try to derive one claim from the other. One may
sketch some paths ; for instance, if you should act only on what you know,
then when you know you have “more” to act on than when youmerely have a
true belief. But these hardly constitute a suitable basis for discussion. Pascal’s
negative answer supported the widespread attitude of keeping the two ideas
apart. I went along and forgot all about it. A few years later, I feel I have ﬁnally
reached a perspective from which I can take up Pascal’s question. My views
on the matter are far from settled, so this is more of a progress report. The
option that I currently ﬁnd the most appealing differs from Pascal’s. Like him,
it denies that we can explain the (alleged) value of knowledge by its normative
role, but unlike him, it does take the normative role of knowledge to shed light
on its value, by showing why it need not have value at all. Before I get to this,
however, I will lay out the perspective fromwhich I take up Pascal’s question.
1. Why knowledge matters
Epistemology in the second half of the XXth century enjoyed a spectacular
revival. But when it came to knowledge it focused almost exclusively on two
questions : what it is and whether we have it. It also asked when a belief
was “justiﬁed”, which, to some at least, was the same as asking what one
ought to believe. But the latter question was mostly treated as independent
of, and prior to, questions about knowledge. For a variety of reasons, by the
1990s epistemologists increasingly wondered whether and why knowledge
mattered. It is well to ask what knowledge is and whether we have it, but,
they began to ask, why should we care ?
The question is pressing if we distinguish knowledge from justiﬁed true
belief — as is common in post-Gettier times. Suppose I come to the conclu-
sion that I do not know whether there are lions. That may be an unsettling
conclusion to reach. But why, exactly ? I may start wondering whether there
really are lions. And I may be unsettled at the thought that there are no lions.
But all that suggests is that whether there are lions matter, not whether I know
that they are. Similarly, I may be unsettled at the thought that I may have been
mistaken on that matter and others. But all that suggests is that whether my be-
liefs are true matters. Another reaction I may have is to judge that I ought not
to believe that there are lions. But all that suggests is that whether my belief that
there are lions is justiﬁed — whether I ought to believe — matters. If whether I
ought to believe it does not whether I know it, then again that does not entail
202 JULIEN DUTANT
that knowledge itself matters. Putting it all together, it may matter whether p,
whether I have a true belief that p, whether I am justiﬁed in believing that p ;
but if I can have a justiﬁed true belief that p without knowing p, it is unclear
whether and why knowing itself matters.1
A somewhat shallow answer defers to common sense. We think about
knowledge a lot. The verb know is currently one of the ten most used verbs in
the Oxford English Corpus. It is the second propositional verb (after say) and
the most common verb describing a mental state (just before see, think, look
and want). It is much more used than believe, true, justiﬁed and even more used
than ought, should and must.2 Since we talk about knowledge a lot, we think
about it a lot. Moreover, we take ourselves to knowmany things and we want
to know many things.3 So philosophers can rest assured that knowledge at
least matters to us.4 The answer is somewhat shallow, however. First, even on
the assumption that knowledge is something we desire, we may still wonder
whether and why it is desirable.5 Second, similar remarks can be made about
other common notions.We take ourselves to do, make and getmany things, and
we want to do,make and getmany things. Yet few philosophers would say that
doing,making or gettingmatter. That is so, I venture, because philosophers take
these notions to be too crude to describe the underlying phenomena. There is
little useful theory to be made about the making that is common to making a
plan, making a present and making a soup. Philosophers found it more useful
to theorize about the underlying phenomena in terms of intention, action, cau-
sation, ownership and so on. One may worry that knowledge is also too crude
a notion for picking up something that matters and that is worth theorizing
about. The worry is made more acute by the existence of epistemological tra-
ditions that do without the notion altogether, adopting instead notions such
as justiﬁcation, evidence, conﬁrmation and probabilistic notions.6
1This line is forcefully pushed by Mark Kaplan (1985).
2“The OEC : Facts about language”, Oxford University Press,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oec-facts-about-the-language, retrieved Jan
4th2014.
3As Aristotle famously notes inMetaphysics A, 1.
4See Williamson (2000, 31) : “For knowing matters ; the difference between knowing and not
knowing is very important to us. Even unsophisticated curiosity is the desire to know.”
5Even subjectivists who think that things are at bottom made valuable by our valuing them
are not committed to the view that everything we desire is desirable.
6Peirce was an early defender of the view that the notion of knowledge is disreputable : “there
will remain over no relic of the good old tenth-century infallibilism, except that of the infallible
scientists, under which head I include [. . . ] all those respectable and cultivated persons who,
having acquired their notions of science from reading, and not from research, have the idea that
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Two more substantial answers have been prominent in recent literature.7
The ﬁrst is that knowledge is good, or, as philosophers prefer to say, that it
has value. Good things obviously matter ; so if knowledge is good, it matters.
The idea famously ﬁgures in Plato’sMeno, where Socrates approvingly reports
that “knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion”.8 The answer only
goes so far. We may still wonder why knowledge is good, and in particular
why it is better than justiﬁed true belief. This has been the subject of much
discussion in the last decade. But as long as we grant that knowledge is good,
as the recent value of knowledge overwhelmingly does, we already have an
answer to why it matters. Call it the value answer.
The second answer comes from the idea that knowledge is something we
ought to have in order to do certain things or have certain attitudes. I will focus
on two such claims. The ﬁrst is that one ought to act only on the basis of what one
knows. Call it the Knowledge–Action Principle. The second is that one ought to
believe only what one knows. Call it the Knowledge–Belief Principle. There are
alternative or additional claims in the vicinity : one ought to do what is best in
view of what one knows ; one ought to believe only on the basis of what one
knows ; one ought to be certain only of what one knows ; and so on. It does not
matter for our purposes which ones we choose ; the two selected above will
serve as concrete illustrations. Now what one ought to believe and what one
ought to do obviously matters. So if what one knows partly determines what
one ought to believe and to do, then knowledge matters. So principle like the
two above also offer an answer to the question why knowledge matters. Call
it the normative role answer.
What the normative role answer amounts to is not entirely clear because
ought may mean many things. For now we just ﬂag the issue ; it will take a
central importance later on.
The normative principles have an ancient pedigree as well. Zeno (of Ci-
tium, the founder of the Stoa) claimed that the wise only assent to what they
have a “grasping impression” of — by which he essentially meant, what they
know.9 Since he clearly thought that one ought to do what the wise does,
“science” means knowledge, while the truth is, it is a misnomer applied to the pursuit of those
who are devoured by a desire to ﬁnd things out.” (Peirce, 1950, 3) (It does not seem to occur to
Peirce that ﬁnding something outmay come down to coming to know.)
7They are not the only ones. Another one (inspired by Craig, 1990) is that knowledge is pro-
perty of people that is useful for us to spot while inquiring : we ﬁgure out who knows what to
decide who to use as source of information.
898a, trad. G.M.A. Grube.
9See e.g. Cicero, Academica 2.77–8, quoted in Long and Sedley (1987) as 40D. Stoics would
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that amounts to an endorsement of the second principle. Academic sceptics
agreed ; but since on their view neither we nor the wise knew anything, they
argued that one ought not to assent to anything. As a result they were under
pressure to deny the ﬁrst. Confronted with the Stoic objection that the wise
would have to act, Carneades developed the idea that one could act on the
basis of merely convincing impressions. The fact that Stoics saw that as an ob-
jection shows that they endorsed the ﬁrst principle as well. Just as the claim
that knowledge is better than mere true belief is often calledMeno’s thesis, we
may call the two principles Zeno’s norms.
The two answers are mutually compatible : it may be that knowledge mat-
ters both because it is a good thing and because it plays a certain normative
role. But it is tempting to see whether one could be used to derive the other.
A Value to Norm derivation would derive Zeno’s norms from Meno’s thesis
and plausible. A Norm to Value derivation would derive Meno’s thesis from
Zeno’s norms. In both cases we would allow the use of plausible background
assumptions. Since there is little about norm or value that is uncontroversial,
we may also generously allow the use of controversial claims about norms or
values in general. As I understand “derivation” no order of priority is requi-
red : it may be that both Meno’s thesis follows from Zeno’s norms and the
other way round.10
This paper discusses both derivations. Section 2. discusses the Value to
Norm route. I am not optimist for it. Some reasons for pessimism come from
Firth (1998a) and Berker (2013a, 2013b). They argue that “consequentialist”
or “teleological” ways of deriving epistemic norms from epistemic values fail
because they result in norms allowing for trade-offs that the correct epistemic
norms for belief forbid. I do not ﬁnd the objection decisive, however. It leaves
some “teleological” derivations standing, as well as non-teleological ones. A
more serious problem seems tome to be the impossibility of deriving anything
say that what we would now describe as paradigm situations of perceptual knowledge (seeing
that an apple is on a table) involve “having a grasping impression”. But they would not call it
“knowledge” (episteme) yet, for they thought that knowledge required resistance to dialectical
cross-examination. Once we set aside this inﬂated view of knowledge — or once we read Stoics’
notion of episteme as denoting something like science or scientiﬁc understanding —, we can take
their theory of “grasping impressions” as a theory of knowledge. (Commentators sometimes do
so without further ado, e.g. Long and Sedley 1987 and Frede 1983/1987 ; see Frede 1999 and Han-
kinson 2003 for more guarded statements.)
10Some characterize “consequential theories” as those that explain the right in terms of the
good and “deontological theories” as those that explain the good in terms of the right. Because
these terms have many associations and because they are meant to be exclusive of each other, I
think it would be misleading to use them to label the Value to Norm and Norm to Value deriva-
tions, respectively.
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like the Knowledge–Action Principle. In a nutshell, the problem is thatMeno’s
Thesis cannot ground a difference in value between a case where one has a
good and a bad belief, but acts on the good one, and a case where one has
a good and a bad belief, but acts on the bad one. Thus the problem arises
because the Knowledge–Action Principle is not simply a norm about belief
but about the coordination of belief and actions.
Section 3. discusses the Norm to Value route. It is prima facie more promi-
sing. Saying so goes against a strong trend in current epistemology : while
there has been much debate over why knowledge is good, little of it has ex-
plored the idea that it is good because of its normative role. Epistemologists
appear to have assumed that something like the Value to Norm derivationwill
in turn explain the normative role of knowledge, and that it would therefore
be illicit to appeal to the normative role of knowledge to explain its value. That
being said, I have doubts about it as well. As far as I can tell, the derivation
would have to rely on the idea that knowledge is good because it is required
to be allowed to believe or act on one’s belief. But in general it is not the case
that necessary conditions for being allowed to do something are good — not
even that necessary conditions for being allowed to do something good are
themselves good. The problem does not show that the derivation fails, but it
indicates that more needs to be say.
Section 4. turns the apparent failure of the Norms to Value derivation into
a virtue. For once we assume that knowledge plays a central normative role,
it becomes unclear what is left of the motivation for the idea that it is a good
thing. For instance, the fact that it plays a central normative role is sufﬁcient
to explain why knowledge matters. There is no need to make the additional
claim that it is a good thing. So we may try to use Zeno’s norms to explain
away Meno’s Thesis. I have put the suggestion forward elsewhere (Dutant
2012, forthcoming). Here I want to discuss two problems for it. The ﬁrst is that
the proposal has a hard time explaining why knowledge is something worth
aiming at, for Zeno’s norms themselves do not prescribe acquiring knowledge.
In reply I argue that such prescriptions follow from Zeno’s norms in conjunc-
tion with other aims and other norms of action. Another is that the proposal
requires a strong primitive, namely a layer of normativity distinct from the
usual “objective” and “subjective” ought that are commonly accepted. I will
put forward a few considerations in its favour.
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2. From Value to Norms
Let us assume Meno’s Thesis and examine whether we can derive Zeno’s
norms.Meno’s Thesis, expressed as the slogan “knowledge is better thanmere
true belief”, is somewhat unspeciﬁed. It is unclear whether it is a generic or
universal claim and what exactly the bearers of value are supposed to be. For
the sake of concreteness we will use on a more precise claim. The claim as-
cribes values to states of affairs. It states that knowledge is pro tanto good and
that belief without knowledge is pro tanto bad :
(MT) For every S, t, p, the state of affairs of S knowing p at t is (pro tanto)
good, and the state of affairs of S believing p without knowing p at t is
(pro tanto) bad.
It follows from (MT) that knowing p is better than having a true belief in p
that does not constitute knowledge. For there is a disvalue in the latter that
is absent in the former, namely believing without knowing. It also follows
from (MT) that knowledge-constituting belief is better than lack of belief, and
that lack of belief is better than belief that does not constitute knowledge. It
does not follow from (MT) that knowing p is always overall good ; the value
that it has in virtue of being knowledge can be offset by other considerations.
Similarly, it does not follow from (MT) that believing without knowledge is
always overall bad ; its disvalue may be offset by other considerations. (MT) is
neutral on whether the pro tanto value of knowing p is the same for every p.
Perhaps some things are more valuable to know than others.
(MT) is stronger than the claim that some ormost state of affairs of knowing
are pro tanto good. It is also stronger than its ﬁrst conjunct alone. If the deriva-
tion fails with that strong assumption, it will fail with weaker ones. We may
give the derivation its best chance.
Norms are about what we ought to do ; values about what is good or bad.
How do we derive one from the other ? A common paradigm is consequen-
tialist : roughly, one ought to do what has or tends to have the best conse-
quences. As Berker (2013a, 351–7) notes, much contemporary epistemology
adopts such a framework.11 It is assumed that we have certain epistemic aims
11In Berker (2013a, 342) prefers the term “epistemic teleology”, because he thinks that “epis-
temic consequentialism” will evoke the view that what one ought to, epistemically speaking, is
what promotes practical (non-epistemic) goods. Firth (1998a) uses the term “epistemic utilitaria-
nism” ; others “epistemic instrumentalism” (Kelly, 2003) . “Epistemic consequentialism” is used
by Percival (2002), Stalnaker (2002) and Berker (2013b), among others. There are some differences
in how these authors characterize the view so labelled. For instance Kelly takes it to include the
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— such as having true belief and no false beliefs — and that what we ought
to do, epistemically speaking, is what promotes those aims. Berker (2013a,
2013b), building on a problem due to Firth (1998a, 1998b), argues that any
such derivation of epistemic norms will fail. That is, any such derivations will
misclassify some justiﬁed beliefs as unjustiﬁed and conversely. While I share
the view that consequentialism is unsuited to derive norms of belief and I
agree that Firth and Berker’s problem shows that many versions of epistemic
consequentialism fail, I do not think they rule out all such versions. Be that
as it may, Berker’s and Firth’s problem leave untouched non-consequentialist
ways of deriving norms from value. So for our purposes, the discussion of
epistemic consequentialism is mostly a side-show. Since, however, the para-
digm is the most familiar one, it is worth going through it.
Berker (2013a, 344–7) characterizes consequentialist normative theories as
having three components. First, a theory of ﬁnal value, which states what things
have value in themselves. Second, a theory of overall value, which ascribes va-
lue to things according to whether and how they promote ﬁnally valuable
things. Third, a deontic theory, which states what one ought to do in terms
of overall value. For our purposes we call a belief one ought to have (or is
allowed to have) a justiﬁed belief and a belief one ought not to have a unjus-
tiﬁed belief. In our attempted derivation, the theory of ﬁnal value is given by
(MT).12 To illustrate a complete theory :
Theory of ﬁnal value. For every S, t, p :
S’s knowing p at t is (pro tanto) ﬁnally good,
S’s believing p without knowing p at t is (pro tanto) bad.
We call “ﬁnal epistemic value” the value that things have in virtue of these
clauses. We assume that there is some way of summing ﬁnal values so that
the total ﬁnal epistemic value of a compound state of affairs is the sum of the
ﬁnal epistemic value of its components.
Theory of overall epistemic value (for state of affairs).
A state of affairs is epistemically better than another iff the total
ﬁnal epistemic value it brings about (or would bring about if it
idea that epistemic norms and values are contingent upon one’s having certain epistemic goals
— an idea he objects too. But all share the core idea that what one ought to do, epistemically
speaking, is a matter of what promotes the epistemically best consequences.
12Rather, we treat it as ﬁnal. The theory leaves open the possibility that the value of knowledge
is ultimately reduced to something else, e.g. the value of true belief or practical value.
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obtained) is greater than the total ﬁnal epistemic value the other
brings about (or would bring about if it obtained).
We leave open what exactly counts as brought about by a state of affairs : all ef-
fects, including long-term ones ; proximate effects ; constitution ; constituents
(see Berker, 2013a, 347 for some discussion).
Deontic theory (for beliefs). For every S, p, t :
S ought to believe p at t, epistemically speaking, iff S’s believing p
at t is overall epistemically better than S’s not believing p at t.
The qualiﬁcation “epistemically speaking” leaves room for one’s epistemic
duties to be overruled by other duties. The ought claim we derive here is an
‘objective’ one : it roughly says that one ought to have the beliefs that in fact
have the best epistemic consequences, whether or not one is aware of them. As
in consequentialist ethics, wemay associate a ‘subjective’ ought to the objective
one :
S (subjectively) ought to believe p at t, epistemically speaking, iff
S’s believing p at t is expectably overall epistemically better than S’s
not believing p at t.
Where something is expectably overall better iff its expected overall value (to S
at t) is higher.13
The crucial feature of consequentialist views, in Berker’s characterization,
is to ascribe overall value to what promotes ﬁnal value. As a result, overall
value typically allows for trade-offs : something may be overall good des-
pite having bad consequences, provided it has many good consequences as
well. Berker take these trade-offs to generate mistaken epistemic norms. He
does not propose a general argument that it is so, however ; rather, he mainly
argues by generalizing from cases.
Berker’s prediction seems borne out when we consider a direct deontic
theory. I call a direct deontic theory one that prescribes a belief directly as a
function of its overall value. Their form is along the lines of :
Believe p iff the (expected) overall value of doing so is above a
certain threshold.
13The principle assumes that a notion of expected overall value is deﬁned — e.g., a sum of
values of possible outcomes weighted by their probability. It leaves open what sort of expectation
is relevant, e.g. what degrees of belief the subject has, or what degrees of belief she should have
in view of her evidence, and so on.
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The theory given above is an illustration. Now take a case of unjustiﬁed be-
lief — say, a belief based on reading tea leaves, while one knows very well
that tea leaves do not indicate anything. We can alter the case so that the be-
lief has many epistemically good consequences — for pretty much any notion
of consequence and any notion of epistemic good. With enough good conse-
quences, the belief will be counted as overall good. We can even pile up the
good consequences until any desired threshold of overall value. By the direct
deontic theory, the belief will be counted as justiﬁed, contra hypothesi. So the
theory is false.
Firth (1998c) has put forward cases along those lines (see also Berker 2013b,
369). A brilliant set theorist is on the verge of a ground-breaking discovery, but
she is suffering from a serious illness and the doctors give us less than two
months’ time. Against all evidence, she clinches to the conviction that she will
live one full year. The belief in fact raises the chances that she survives long
enough to complete her work. Her present belief that she will live has good
epistemic consequences : it is a means for her to acquire further knowledge.
However, it is not a belief she ought to have, epistemically speaking ; it is
unjustiﬁed. So the theory stated above misclassiﬁes it.14
It is less clear that Berker’s prediction holds good when we consider in-
direct deontic theories. Broadly, we may call “indirect” deontic theories those
that prescribe beliefs in virtue of a relation to something of overall value. But
more precisely, prominent indirect theories all prescribe beliefs in virtue of the
overall value of the process, disposition or rule they result from.15 These deontic
theories are along the lines :
Believe p on basis X iff the (expected) overall value of X is above a
14The example targets the ‘objective’ ought claim, but we can adapt it to ‘subjective’ ones. We
may suppose, for instance, that the set theorist knows that if she somehow manages to convince
herself that she will live ten more years, that will keep her alive for the six months needed to com-
plete her work and acquire much new knowledge. Hence the theorist may expect the belief to have
good epistemic consequences ; yet it is not a belief she ought to have, epistemically speaking, since
everything indicates that she will not survive ten years.
15There is a rough parallel between act- vs. rule-utilitarianism and direct vs. indirect theories.
The theories require a theory of overall value for process types, dispositions or rules. Typically it
is characterized in terms of effects of (actual and possible) instances of the process, manifestations
of the dispositions or applications of the rule.
Berker’s (2013a, 347) characterization of indirect theories is slightly different. On his account
an indirect deontic theory comprises (a) a norm that directly prescribes processes (rules etc.) on the
basis of their overall value, and (b) a norm that prescribes beliefs depending onwhether they result
from allowed processes (rules etc.). My characterization leaves (a) out and replaces “allowed” by
“overall good enough” in (b). They are equivalent for present purposes.
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certain threshold.
The argument sketched above does not apply to those theories. By the trade-
off aspect of overall value, there will be bases with some bad consequences —
but many good ones — that will have an above-threshold overall value. But
why think that we will ﬁnd unjustiﬁed beliefs with such bases ? Considering
a few concrete cases will help.
If we are liberal about consequences, we will certainly ﬁnd such cases.
Take a case of unjustiﬁed belief resulting from a certain process X. Modify
the case so that uses of X regularly but indirectly bring about good episte-
mic consequences. For instance, whenever one reads tea leaves, one gets in
a good mood that greatly increases one’s inferential abilities. In the resulting
case process X has overall good epistemic consequences. But the belief based
on it is still unjustiﬁed. As Berker (2013b, 374) notes, these cases are avoided
by indirect theories that restrict the consequences relevant to overall value to
proximate ones.
Berker (2013b, 374) puts forward a further type of case. The case targets
epistemic consequentialist theories that use true belief as ﬁnal value. It goes as
follows : a man has a single process to evaluate whether a number is prime :
namely, when presented with any number, he forms the belief that it is not
prime. The process is quite dumb, but it produces a high ratio of true beliefs,
given the relative rarity of primes among numbers. Hence it has an overall
good value ; by the indirect deontic theory, the beliefs it produces are justi-
ﬁed. But they are not. I agree, but it is not easy to generalize the example to
theories that take knowledge as ﬁnal value. For the envisaged process does not
produce any knowledge : when the man forms the true belief that 8 is not
prime, he is merely guessing. So knowledge-based indirect epistemic conse-
quentialism does not have to ascribe the process any overall value. To get a
parallel example with knowledge, we need a process or disposition that typi-
cally produces knowledge, but on one occasion produces an unjustiﬁed belief.
It is not clear that there are such cases. Prima facie, if one forms one’s belief in
a manner that would typically yield knowledge, that one’s belief would seem
justiﬁed. To discuss precise examples would get us into unclear debates about
what counts as “the” process bywhich a belief is formed. For present purposes
it sufﬁces to register the worry that Berker’s case reveals a problem with the
idea that reliability — in a sense relevant to justiﬁcation — is merely a matter
of ratio of true beliefs.
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A perhaps more serious problem with knowledge-centred indirect conse-
quentialism is the following.16 Suppose that a process typically fails to pro-
duce knowledge, but sometimes does. An indirect consequentialist account
may count the overall value of the process bad, and as a result the belief it
produces as unjustiﬁed. In particular, those that constitute knowledge would
nevertheless be unjustiﬁed. That goes against the common idea that know-
ledge entails justiﬁcation. However, there may be independent reasons to re-
ject it (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010). Alternatively, one may as before doubt whether
such cases are possible.
So while Firth and Berker’s problem rule out direct epistemic consequen-
tialist theories and truth-belief-centred ones, it is less clear that it arises for
knowledge-centred indirect theories restricted to proximate effects. Such theo-
ries need not even adhere to the “separateness of propositions” (the idea that
ﬁnal epistemic value with respect to one proposition cannot be aggregated
with ﬁnal epistemic value with respect to another proposition) and the “se-
parateness of times” (the idea that overall value at a time is only a matter of
promoting ﬁnal value at that time) that Berker takes to be necessary to avoid
certain trade-offs.
Whateverwe think of epistemic consequentialism, there are non-consequentialist
ways of deriving epistemic norms from values. A simple one is :
S ought to believe p at t iff S’s believing p at t has (would have)
ﬁnal epistemic value.
In conjunction with (MT) it follows that S ought to believe p if S knows p, or
if S would know p were they to form the belief. So the theory gives us the
Knowledge–Belief Principle.
But I fail to see how to derive the Knowledge–Action Principle from Me-
no’s Thesis alone. Meno’s thesis does imply that acting on knowledge has
more value than acting on a belief that is not knowledge. For the ﬁrst entails
having knowledge, which is good, and the second entails having a belief that
is not knowledge, which is bad. But consider the following pair of states of
affairs :
(a) one knows that p, has a mere belief that q, and acts on p.
(b) one knows that p, has a mere belief that q, and acts on q.
16I owe the problem to John Hawthorne.
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Meno’s Thesis cannot count one state of affairs as better than the other. Both
include a piece of knowledge and a belief that is not knowledge. The only dif-
ference between the two is that the action is caused by the piece of knowledge
in one and the mere belief in the other. But that difference is not valued by
Meno’s Thesis. It need not have effects that are valued by Meno’s Thesis ei-
ther. So fromMeno’s Thesis alone we cannot derive different values to the two
states of affairs. Without different values, it is hard to see howwe could derive
a deontic theory that prescribes the ﬁrst and forbids the second. Of course we
could simply build the Knowledge–Action Principle in our deontic theory ;
but that would not be deriving norms from values.17
In sum, it appears possible to derive one of Zeno’s norms from Meno’s
Thesis : namely, the Knowledge–Belief principle according towhich one ought
to believe only what is known. That can be done in a straightforward non-
consequentialist way, and perhaps also in a consequentialist manner. But it
does not appear possible to derive Zeno’s other norm : the Knowledge–Action
principle, according to which one ought to act only on what is known. It is not
possible to do so becauseMeno’s Thesis only ascribes value to knowledge, not
to relations between one’s action and knowledge.
3. From Norms to Value
Let us consider the opposite direction instead. We assume that Zeno’s norms
hold and try to derive Meno’s thesis. But before we do this, it is worth spelling
out the norms more carefully. We stated them as follows :
Knowledge–Belief Principle One ought to believe only what one knows.
Knowledge–Action Principle One ought to act only on the basis of what one
knows.
But ought is a notoriously slippery term. It can be used to mean many things,
so the claims above should be clariﬁed. I will distinguish two dimensions of
variation in what ought claims express.18 First, theymay vary along normative
17There are further loops one may go through in this argument, but I do not think they alter
the conclusion. One may consider adding more assumptions about value. For instance, we may
assume that some actions are good. Insofar as these actions are based on beliefs, the total state
of affairs of doing those actions based on those beliefs would be better if the beliefs in questions
constitute knowledge. Still, pairs like the one above may still be built.
18As far as semantics is concerned, we may assume that these variations correspond to va-
rious contextually-speciﬁed semantic values of “ought”. The standard contextualist semantics of
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sources. Normative sources are usually put under broad headings such as mo-
ral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, all-things-considered, and so on. But I think ought
claims may reﬂect much more ﬁne-grained sources, such as what is prudent for
a given task, what is prudent relative to health, and so on. An attractive hypothe-
sis is that normative sources correspond to values : each dimension or aspect
of value is a source of ought claims. Second, ought claims vary along norma-
tive layers. A typical distinction of normative layer is the one commonly made
between ‘objective’ vs. ‘subjective’ ought. The distinction is orthogonal to the
previous one : if you have mistaken information about the laws, for instance,
we can distinguish what you objectively legally ought to do from what you
subjectively legally ought to do. The same goes for any other source of value.
Thirdly, some ought claims are arguably not normative.19
The best reading of Zeno’s norms, I claim, is that (a) they are normative,
though perhaps hypothetically so ; (b) that do not express any speciﬁc nor-
mative source, but a normative layer ; (c) that the normative layer is expressed
is distinct both from the traditional ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ ones. Let me
detail these points.
Genuinely normative
First, not all ought claims are normative. When ought is used normatively,
there is something amiss with somebody who sincerely accepts that some-
thing ought to be so but does not in anyway favour its being so.20 When it is
used non-normatively, there is nothing amiss in doing so. In their most natural
reading, the sentences below make non-normative claims :
The sky ought to be cloudy tomorrow morning.
Kratzer (2010) could be used. But we need not endorse such semantics here ; we can leave open
how exactly the various things that ought claims express or convey correlate with the semantics
of “ought”.
19See e.g. Broome (2013, chap. 1).
20Some characterize an all-things-considered ought as the sense of “ought” which makes the
following schema true : it is irrational to believe that you ought to φ without intending to φ
(Broome, 2013, 22). Normative oughts may be characterized by a weaker schema : it is irrational
to believe that S ought to φ without being to some extent in favour of S φ-ing. (As the phrase is
used here, one can be to some extent in favour of something without being overall in favour of
it.) For some expressivists the schema holds because believing that something ought to be so in
the normative sense just is to have a favouring attitude towards it. I do not want to endorse this
idea here ; perhaps there are cases where one sincerely believes that one ought to do something
without in any way favouring it. I am content with the vague albeit clear enough idea that when
one believes that they ought to do something, they would normally (they are expected to, meant
to, supposed to) favour it to some extent.
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The plural of “mouse” ought to be “mouses”. (Broome 2013, 9)
The ﬁrst would normally be used to express what you expect to be the case
— an “epistemic” reading of ought. It would not suggest that you somehow
favour a cloudy sky. The second may be used not to express one’s expecta-
tions about English nor one’s recommendations for it, but to register instead
a regularity.
The simplest view on Zeno’s norms is that they are normative. Unfortuna-
tely, things are not so simple. For Zeno’s normsmay also be hypothetical oughts,
which, if there are any, are neither of the straightforward normative type nor
of the straightforward non-normative type. The idea is best illustrated with
have to. Consider :
How can one get to the sarcophagus ? — Well, it’s not easy. You
have to demolish the painted wall in the antechamber.
The dialogue may take place between two people to whom it is very clear that
nobody ought in any sense to get to the sarcophagus. So the claim is not a
straightforward normative ought. On the other hand, the claim has normative
implications. For it clearly follows from what the second person says that if
one has to get to the sarcophagus, then one has to demolish the wall. Thus the
claim may be understood as a shorthand for the conditional form such as “if
you want to get to the sarcophagus you have to demolish the wall”. Similar
phenomena may arise with ought. Call them hypothetical oughts.
Whether hypothetical oughts are normative or non-normative ismoot. Condi-
tionals of the form “If you want A, you ought to B” have at least in principle
two readings, often labelled “narrow-scope” and “wide-scope”.21 On the ﬁrst
reading, the claim is that if some condition obtains (you want A), some norm
holds (you ought to B). On the second, the claim is that a norm holds, whose
content is : (either you do not want A or you B). On the ﬁrst reading, the
claim is strictly speaking not normative, though its combination with additio-
nal claims may entail something normative. On the second reading, the claim
is normative. It forbids a certain combination of attitude and action. The two
readings would arise for ought claims that are implicitly hypothetical, if there
are any.
21Broome (1999) ; see Kolodny (2005) and Broome (2013) for further discussion. Talk of scope
should not be taken too literally. The two readings may be achieved by several linguistic mecha-
nisms : for instance, one can get the “narrow-scope” reading by having a wide-scope oughtwhose
domain of quantiﬁcation is restricted by the if clause.
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Now some philosophers would treat vast ranges of ought claims as hypo-
thetical. Some would treat all prudential ought claims as hypothetical ; some
would treat all pro tanto ought as hypothetical. On a wide-scope account, some
could even treat all oughts as hypothetical, that is, they could hold that correct
oughts claims all bear on combinations of attitudes and actions.
I do not want to take a stake on such views. I want to leave open whether
Zeno’s claims are of the simple normative kind or of the hypothetical one.
Since the later may turn out to be not strictly speaking normative, I leave open
that Zeno’s claims are not strictly normative. All that matters here is that they
are no less normative than e.g. ordinary prudential ought claims are.
A distinct normative layer
Second, normative layers. Let us ﬁrst illustrate the common distinction bet-
ween “subjective” and “objective” ought. A doctor has a patient with a well-
known disease. There are two treatments for it, the old and the new. The old
has strong side-effects and is now almost entirely out of use. The doctor na-
turally prescribes the new. But the patient turns out to have an hitherto unk-
nown allergy to it. The doctor then switches to the old and the patient is cured.
Is the following true ?
The doctor ought to have given the old treatment straight away.
We are pulled both ways. On the one hand, the right treatment for the patient
was the old one. So the doctor ought to have given it straight away. If we had
knew in advance of the patient’s allergy, that is what we would have told the
doctor, and it would have been correct for us to do so. On the other hand,
the doctor did what she should have done. Since the new treatment is bet-
ter, and there was nothing to indicate that the patient would react badly, she
had to give the new treatment. Indeed it would have been inappropriate for
her to give the patient the old one. So what ought the doctor to have done ?
A common answer to the puzzle is to distinguish two senses of ought, cal-
led “subjective” and “objective”. What one objectively ought to do is what one
ought to do in view of the facts. What one subjectively ought to do is what one
ought to do in view of one’s information or one’s perspective on the facts.
From the doctor’s original perspective, the right action was to prescribe the
new treatment. But in view of the facts, the right action was to prescribe the
old treatment straight away.
There are two misconceptions to avoid here. The ﬁrst is to think that sub-
jective ought claims are not normative. For instance, one may think that “S
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subjectively-ought to F” is roughly equivalent to “S believes that they objectively-
ought to F”. The fact that it expresses S’s belief about what they in fact ought
to do would explain why we expect S to act accordingly. But the fact that it
merely expresses S’s belief about what they ought to do would mean that it is
not normative. But that picture of the relation of the two oughts is wrong. To
see this, it is best to consider a case where the two come apart and the subject
knows that they do. Regan’s Mine Shafts story (1980, 265n1, see also Parﬁt 2011,
159) is one such case. Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or shaft B, but
we do not know which. The water is rising, and we have three options : open
gate A, open gate B, or open both. If we open only the gate of the shaft where
they are, they will all die ; if we open the gate of the other shaft, they will all
be save. If we open both gates, one of them, but only one, will die, no matter
what shaft they are in. In that case we know that what we objectively ought to
do is either to open gate A or to open gate B. It is not to open both gates. But
arguably what we subjectively ought to do is to open both gates. Since we do
not know which shaft the miners are in, we must minimize risk and avoid the
death of all. The cases illustrates several points about the relations between
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ ought claims. First, it shows that we subjectively
ought to do is not what we believe we objectively ought to do : for we do
know that closing both shaft is not what we ought to do in view of the facts.
Second, it shows that there is something genuinely normative about ‘subjecti-
ve’ oughts : there is a clear normative sense in which we ought to close both
shafts. It is neither the expression of some non-normative standard nor a mere
appearance or illusion. Third, it shows that there is something genuinely nor-
mative about ‘objective’ oughts : if we learned that we objectively ought to do
close shaft A, then that would become what we subjectively ought to do as
well. There is a (hard to specify) sense in which ‘objective’ oughts prevail over
‘subjective’ ones wherever possible. So both oughts are genuinely normative.
Now once we have said what S objectively ought to do and what they subjec-
tively ought to do, it is tempting to react as follows : “granted, what S ought
to do in view of the fact is this, and what they ought to do in view of their
information is that, but what ought they to do in the end ? What ought they to
do, simpliciter ?”. But the question makes no sense ; the two oughts both hold,
they are both normative, and they do not conﬂict.
The second misconception is that the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ oughts
express different sources of normativity. We we are confronted with sources
of normativity, there is conﬂict : what we owe to the state vs. what we owe
to our family, what we ought to do for ourselves vs. what we owe to do to
others, what we ought to do for the task at hand vs. what we ought to do for
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our long-term goals, and so on. (Of courses two sources of normativity may
prescribe the same thing ; but at least conﬂict may in principle arise.) Conﬂict
is solved by compromise, prevalence of one norm, or even not resolved at
all. But it always involves some considerations in favour of doing something
and some considerations against that are balanced against each other. Nothing
such arises with ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ readings of ought claims. First, ‘ob-
jective’ ought is not one category of ought alongside moral, legal, prudential and
so on. There is no situation where what we “objectively” ought to do is F but
what we “prudentially” ought to do is not F. Rather, for each of the categories
moral, legal and so on, there are objective oughts. It may be, for instance, that
in view of the facts the legal thing to do would be F but, still in view of the
facts, the prudent thing to do would not be F. The same holds for ‘subjective’
ought : it is not one category alongside moral, prudential and so on. One may
be tempted to think so, if one calls it the ought of rationality ; one could think
that in some cases we have a conﬂict between what is rational to do and, say,
what is morally right to do. But I think this is a confusion. For each normative
source such as the legal, the moral and so on, there is a rational way to pur-
sue it ; to each of these correspond distinct ‘subjective’ ought claims. The kind
of cases where we seem to pit morality against rationality are in effect cases
where we pit what is morally required against what is prudentially required
— for instance, what we subjectively ought to do, morally speaking and what
we subjectively ought to do in view of our interests alone. Second, ‘objective’
ought and ‘subjective’ ought are not such a conﬂict with each other. Suppose
we observe somebody caught in a dilemma between two moral duties. We
will see the two duties in opposition ; we will often look for a compromise ;
if one duty prevail, we will still feel the force of the considerations brought
by the other. We may say, for instance : “On the one hand she must be true
to her mother ; on the other hand she should not break the promise made to
her sister to keep their secret ; the only way for her to do both is to avoid tal-
king to her mother at all ; but if it came to that, she would have to betray her
sister.” Contrast when we observe a “conﬂict” of ‘objective’ ought and ‘subjec-
tive’ ought, as in the Mine Shafts case. We do not say : “On the one hand the
miners are in A and she objectively ought to open gate B ; on the other hand
she subjectively ought to open both gates”.We do not try to ﬁnd a compromise
between the two oughts. If we are about to offer advice, the ‘objective’ ought
alone will matter and considerations of what the agent subjectively ought to
do at that time will have no force whatsoever. If we are discussing whether the
agent acted in a stupid or evil manner, the ‘subjective’ ought alone will have
weight. Each corresponds to a distinctive layer of normative claims. They are
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not different sources in conﬂict within a single layer.
The best way to understand Zeno’s norms is that they intend to capture
a distinctive layer of normativity. The ‘subjective’ ought is supposed to corres-
pond to what is best in view of one’s ‘information’ or from one’s ‘perspective’.
But there are various notions of ‘information’ or ‘perspective’ to consider. In
our original example, giving the new treatment was what the doctor ought
to do in view of what they knew, but also what they believed. But the two can
come apart. In some cases, the doctor irrationally believes that the patient will
respond well to the new treatment. Doing so would then be what she ought to
do in view of what she believes but not in view of what she knows or rationally
believes. In some cases, what the doctor ought to do in view of what they know
may differ from what they ought to do in view of what they rationally believe.
That may be so, for instance, if all the doctor as ever heard about the new treat-
ment is in fact a fabrication ; she rationally believes it, but there is nothing to
it. If so in view of all that she knows — namely, that the old treatment works
— what she ought to do is to give the old treatment, even though in view of
what she rationally believes it is to give the new one. Now one may argue
that these difference correspond to distinct but genuine normative layers. If
someone does what she believes to be best, without rationally believing that it
is best, then there is a sense in which they do what they ought to be doing and
a sense in which they do not. If someone does what she rationally believes to
be best, without it being best in view of what they know, then, it is argued,
here as well there is a sense in which they do what they ought to be doing and
a sense in which they do not.
So the most charitable way to assume Zeno’s norms is to grant that there
is a distinctive layer of normativity about which they hold. There is a sense
of ought in which one ought to believe only what one knows and one ought
to act only what one knows. It is distinct from some ‘subjective’ oughts, such
as (some notions of) rationality : it is sometimes rational to act on something
we do not know, for instance when everything misleadingly indicates that we
know it.22 It is not an ‘objective’ ought : in the Mine Shaft case, it matches the
‘subjective’ one instead.
22Philosophers sometimes distinguish “procedural rationality”, which is merely a matter of
having coherent attitudes and “substantial rationality”, which requires more, e.g. having beliefs
that ﬁt the evidence and desire things that are worth desiring. These would also correspond to
distinct layers of rationality ; the one is clearly distinguished from a knowledge-based normative
layer ; the second less clearly so.
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No distinctive source
We should not read Zeno’s norms as expressing a distinctive source of norma-
tivity. That is most defensible for the Knowledge–Action Principle. We may
imagine a case where in view of what you know, you morally ought to help so-
meone but it is not in your best interest ; while in fact, you morally ought not
to help them but it is your best interest. That may happen for instance if an ec-
centric rich man pretends to be in dire poverty and need your help. In view of
what you know, the moral thing to do is to help them, though it is not in your
interest. In view of all relevant facts, there is no moral requirement to help
him, though doing so will happen to bring you a hefty reward. In such a case
we do not have a knowledge-based ought that enters in conﬂict with a moral
one and a prudential one. Rather, morality and prudence each generate their
knowledge-based ought alongside their ‘objective’ one. The requirement to
act on what you know is a distinctive normative layer, not a normative source.
With the Knowledge – Belief principle, the claim is more debatable. Consi-
der standard cases of believing for practical reasons. An athlete knows that
they have no chance to win the race, but they also know that believing that
they will win will improve their time. One may feel a conﬂict analogous to a
conﬂict of prudence and morality here. What the athlete epistemically ought to
do is to believe that they will not win ; what they prudentially ought to do is
to convince herself that she will win. The two oughts conﬂict ; and both are at
the layer of knowledge-based oughts.23 So one may be tempted to count the
Knowledge – Belief principle to reﬂect a particular normative source.
If we did so we would get Meno’s thesis fairly straightforwardly. An at-
tractive hypothesis about normative sources is that they all reﬂect values.
What one ought morally to do derives from what is morally good, what one
ought prudentially to do derives from what is good for one, and so on. More
precisely, what one ‘objectively’ X-ly ought to do is what is X-ly good ; what
one X-ly ought to do in view of what one beliefs is what has higher expected
X-ly value, where the expectations are given by one’s beliefs ; what one X-ly
ought to do in view of what one beliefs is what has higher expected X-ly va-
lue, where the expectations are given by one’s knowledge ; and so on. Now if
the hypothesis holds, one ‘objectively’ ought to believe only what one knows
23To parallel the foregoing case, one can imagine a variant where in view of what the athlete
knows, they have no chance to win but believing that they do is likely to improve their time,
while in fact they are likely to win but the belief would lower their chances. We seem to have an
epistemic vs. prudential conﬂict both at the ‘objective’ and knowledge-based layer, and the two
layers are distinct.
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if and only if it is bad to believe what one does not know. So the norm would
entail (part of)Meno’s Thesis.24 The resulting set of claims is virtually indistin-
guishable form the non-consequentialist derivation of the Knowledge–Belief
principle we examined earlier. While we would have derived Meno’s Thesis,
it would not be clear, however, that we would have explained it. For one may
think that the hypothesis holds because values ground norms ; if so, we are
in effect explaining the Knowledge–Belief Principle by Meno’s Thesis and not
the opposite.
Be that as it may, I will focus on another construal of the Knowledge–Belief
Principle. It is best seen by rewriting the principle thus :
Knowledge–Belief Principle (rewritten) One ought to believe only what is
true in view of what one knows.
We start with the idea that having true beliefs and not having false beliefs is a nor-
mative source ; that is, something that a source of oughts that may in principle
conﬂict withmoral, prudential, legal considerations and so on. The source will
generate various layers of oughts. Roughly : that one ‘objectively’ ought to be-
lieve what is in fact true ; that one purely subjectively ought to believe what
is true in view of what one believes ; and that one ‘knowledgeably’ ought to
believe what is true in view of what one knows. The latter is the Knowledge-
Belief Principle. It reﬂects both a normative source, in its requirement of be-
lieving the truth, and a normative layer, in its focus on what one ought to
believe in view of what one knows. To take the dimension of layer apart, we
may focus on a more general principle :
Generalized Knowledge–Belief Principle One ought to form one’s belief in
view of what one knows.
The principle generates epistemic oughts, when combined with the idea that
one ought to form true beliefs, but also prudential oughts, when combined
with the idea that one ought to form useful beliefs, for instance.
Back to the derivation
The Knowledge–Action principle and the Generalized Knowledge–Belief prin-
ciple delineate a signiﬁcant normative role for knowledge. Can we derive
24To entail Meno’s Thesis we should add the positive principle that one should believe what
one is in position to know.
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from them the claim that knowledge is better than belief that is not know-
ledge ? Engel (2009) takes the answer to be negative, but does not discuss
why.25 Prima facie, there seems to be a way. First, we assume that believing the
truth is good and that acting in the light of true propositions is good. These
are assumptions about value, but distinct from the straightforward assump-
tion that knowledge itself is good. Second, it follows from Zeno’s norms that
in order to do these good things, we are in some sense required to have know-
ledge — and not merely true belief. (The sense in which we are required to do
so is the one that corresponds to the sense ought has in Zeno’s norms.) From
this, it seems, we can conclude that knowledge is better than true belief.
The derivation has some appeal. It seems plausible that (normative) condi-
tions for doing good things are themselves good. If knowledge (normatively)
allows you to form beliefs and act on them, then insofar as these beliefs and
acts are good, knowledge would seem to be a good thing.
As it stands, the derivation fails. It is not in general true that (normative)
conditions for doing good things are themselves good. Apologizing for one’s
faults is good ; one ought to apologize for one’s mistakes only if one made
mistakes ; but making mistakes is not good. That being said, there are unde-
niably many cases where conditions for doing good things seem good, and
seem good precisely in virtue of being such. One would need a restricted ver-
sion of the principle. If the restricted version applies to the case of knowledge,
the derivation would succeed.
The route from Norms to Values is more promising. Whether it ultimately
succeeds depends on whether we can ﬁnd a plausible motivation of the idea
that knowledge is good because it is normatively required to do good things.
It is worth stressing that, if it is ultimately successful, it would yield a picture
of the value of knowledge that is at odds with much of the current literature.
Much current literature tries to show that knowledge is valuable by showing
that it is a worthwhile thing to aim at, either as an end or as means to some
end. On the present perspective, knowledge would be good because it is nor-
matively required to aim at anything.
25Engel (2009, sec. 5) calls the idea that knowledge is relevant to what we ought to do “prag-
matic relevance” and writes : “Of course if the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment reduces,
as I have claimed, to that of pragmatic relevance, question (2) [the question whether pragmatic
encroachment explains why knowledge is valuable] has to be answered in the negative”. He does
not discuss the idea further, but assumes that it is only if pragmatic encroachment is more that
something like the Knowledge–Action principle that it could explain the value of knowledge.
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4. Doing Without Value
We started with a pair of ideas : that knowledge has value, and that it enters
certain norms. We have tried to derive one idea from the other. I have argued
that the norms cannot be derived from the value and I have expressed doubts
as to whether the value can be derived from the norms. Now I want to stress
another perspective : namely, that once we assume the knowledge-involving
norms, it is unclear whether there is any way to motivate the idea that know-
ledge has value. I have made the suggestion elsewhere (Dutant, 2012 ; forth-
coming). Here I will discuss a couple of objections to it.
Why should we think that knowledge has more value than true belief ?
Many philosophers treat it as a (at least prima facie) platitude in need of no
defence. To them, it is (at least prima facie) obvious that there is something
commendable about believing something when you know it that there is not
about believing it when you do not know it. But note that that is explainable
on the basis of the Knowledge – Belief principle alone. If that principle holds,
then there is a sense in which you do what you ought to do when you believe
p while knowing p and you do not when you believe p while not knowing p.
That is enough to explain that there is something commendable about know-
ledge that mere true belief lacks. That does not require or entail that there is
something genuinely better about it. What we ought to do and what is good
may come apart. If you face a choice between A and B, if A is bad but every-
thing indicates that it is good and better than B, then there is a sense in which
you ought to choose A, but wemay deny that choosing A is genuinely good.26
Some will think that doing what one ought to do has value in itself.27
They would endorse the straightforward derivation of Meno’s thesis from the
Knoweldege-Belief principle that we sketched earlier. But there is no need
to accept that view. In particular, normative sources and levels may stand dif-
ferently in their relation to value. There is some plausibility that normative
sources reﬂect different values : the morally required derives from the morally
good, the prudentially required derives from the personally good, and per-
haps the epistemically required derives from the value of believing the truth.
26We use adjectives like “good” fairly liberally. There are very natural uses on which “you
should do that” and “doing that would be good” are virtually interchangeable. With these uses
we may well say that choosing A was the “good” choice. But in laying out a theory of value and
norms one may need use “good” and “value” more strictly. Strictly speaking, choosing Awas not
good ; it just seemed good. That it seemed good made it the choice you ought to make ; but that
need not itself make it genuinely good.
27Piller (2009) pursues this line to explain the value of knowledge.
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But normative layers do not require additional values. Rather, each normative
layer correspond to a different way to derive an ought from a value. Givenmo-
ral goods, there is when we objectively ought to do for the moral good ; what
we ought to do for the moral good in view of what we believe ; what we ought
to do for the moral good in view of what we know ; and so on. We have ar-
gued that the Knowledge–Action principle and the Generalized Belief–Action
principle express a normative layer and no particular normative source. If that
is so, they need not be associated with any value at all.
Do we have any other reason to think that knowledge is valuable ? Know-
ledge is deﬁnitely something that matters. But as we have seen, its normative
role is enough to explain that it does.
The best reason to think that knowledge has value is, I think, the idea that
knowledge is worth aiming at. We want knowledge ; we strive for it and we
are ready to make sacriﬁces for it. We are not foolproof ; but assuming that
we are right in this, knowledge is something we ought to aim at. Conversely,
a theory that denies that knowledge is something we ought to aim at has to
claim that we are misguided in that respect. If knowledge is good, we have
a straightforward explanation of why we ought to aim at it. For in general,
we ought to aim at good things. Conversely, if knowledge has no value, it
becomes doubtful whether we should aim at it.
The idea raises a difﬁculty for the view that knowledge plays a important
normative role but has no value. Zeno’s norms alone do not entail that we
should acquire knowledge. One may comply with both norms by avoiding
belief and action altogether. Less radically, one who complies with the norms
at one point may comply with them onwards by not acquiring any new belief
and acting only on what they already know. In reply, I would point out that
the norms entails requirements to acquire knowledge in conjunctionwith other
norms or values. For instance, if we assume that it is better to act on more
relevant facts, we may derive that one ought to acquire more knowledge of
relevant facts. Similarly, we may assume that it is good to have true beliefs
on a range of topics ; if so, we may derive that one ought to acquire more
knowledge. It is not trivial to work the reply out properly. For instance, it is not
obvious that it is always better to act on more relevant facts. For our purposes,
it is sufﬁcient to show that there are some ways to ground requirements to
acquire knowledge that do not assume that knowledge is itself valuable.
Another difﬁculty for the view that grants knowledge a normative role but
no value is worth discussing. The view assumes Zeno’s norms, or something
like them. The assumption is not trivial. As we have argued, the best way
to understand them is to postulate a normative layer distinct from the tradi-
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tional ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ ones. One may fell uneasy about the very
idea of layers of normativity, and about the idea that knowledge-based ought
claims delineate a distinctive layer. In reply, I will make a couple of points.
First, as I have argued, it is difﬁcult to make sense of cases such as Regan’s
Mine Shafts case without accepting that there are at least two distinct layers
of normativity ; each genuinely normative but not conﬂicting. Second, once
we have admitted the idea of layers, it is easy to see how they multiply. Wi-
thin a belief-based layer alone, we can often distinguish opposite ought claims
derived from various natural subsets of one’s beliefs. For instance, one may
have a set of salient beliefs in view of which one ought to do A ; but one may
at the same time have some deeply buried beliefs, such that in view of them
and the salient ones, one ought not to do A. In such cases, an onlooker may
feel both the pull of “they ought to have done A” and the pull of “they ought
not to have done A”. Or again, one may impeccably infer a conclusion from a
set of crazy premises. In such a case we may feel both the pull of “they ought
to have inferred that conclusion” and of the opposite ; one is what one ought
to do in view of one’s premise beliefs, the other what they ought to do in view
of some broader background. The divisions may be multiplied : there may be
cases where one’s conclusion is correct in view of the premises, insane in view
of the premises of the premisses, correct again in view of the premisses of the
premisses of the premisses, and so on indeﬁnitely. I see no reason to reduce
the profusion of these normative layers to one or two. As long as each ought-
question we care about manages to pick up a speciﬁc enough layer, we can
leave with many oughts. On the backdrop of these many normative layers, the
knowledge-based one is not a cost.
Summing up, once we grant that knowledge plays a central normative role
along of the lines of Zeno’s norms, it is not clear that there is anything left to
motivate the idea that knowledge is of distinctive value. So Zeno’s norms can
be used to explain awayMeno’s thesis. In that perspective, the normative role
of knowledge allows us to explain why it matters without having value.
5. Conclusion
I have highlighted two possible answers to the question why knowledge mat-
ters. One is that it has value. Another is that it plays a signiﬁcant normative
role. I have granted that if knowledge had value, or if it did play the alleged
normative role, then it would matter. For most of the discussion I have re-
mained neutral on whether knowledge has value or does play that normative
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role. My central question has been instead whether we can derive one idea
from the other. That is, whether assuming the idea that knowledge has value
— and some defensible general hypotheses about norms and values —, we
could derive the claim that it plays the alleged normative role. Or whether,
assuming that knowledge does play that role — and some defensible gene-
ral hypotheses —, we could derive the claim that it has value. I have found
the route from Value to Norms unsuccessful. The main problem here is that
the idea that knowledge has value does not seem enough to derive the idea
that one should act on what one knows. I have found the route from Norms
to Value more promising, though a complete path is missing. The main idea
here is that knowledge is good because it is normatively required to do good
things, such as believing the truth and acting in view of true propositions.
But since not all normative condition for doing something good is itself good,
we still lacked an explanation of why knowledge would be so. Finally, I have
suggested an alternative perspective, on which we would not try to derive
the idea that knowledge has value from its normative role, but rather use its
normative role to explain away the idea that it has value. The general idea is
that if knowledge does play the normative role in question, then the fact that
it does explains while knowledge seems to be something that has value. But
there is no need to think that it has ; all that matters about knowledge could
be explained by its normative role.
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